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 Conclusion 




 The aim of  this book was to historicize practices of  quantification that are now at 
the core of  humanitarian government. A historical perspective allows us to look 
beyond the current hype around “humanitarian data.” It also allows us to take 
a nuanced look at critiques of  relief  aid. While the apologists for big numbers 
idealize the robustness of  “humanitarian data” and expect too much from them, 
critics often miss the fact that statistics are not solely an ideological superstruc-
ture or “hubris,” and often do have real effects (even if  these effects are rarely 
those expected by the quantification’s apologists). Humanitarian quantification, 
as I hope to have shown, is neither a panacea nor a mere fiction. It is an integral 
part of  the humanitarian government and plays a key role in the running of  the 
whole engine. Practices of  quantification are not merely ideological. They have 
their own logic, materiality, and effects – whether one believes in their useful-
ness or not. Humanitarian statistics mobilize resources and crystalize opposition. 
Actors involved in the humanitarian field  have to take them into account – be it 
to interpret or produce them, or to criticize or refute them. The main effect of  
humanitarian statistics may be the effect they have on the humanitarian sector 
itself. Their raison d’être might well be to stabilize the relation between different 
humanitarian organizations competing for resources, public attention, and access 
to target populations. 
 When we took a close look at the genesis of  a new humanitarian number, we saw 
diplomatic negotiations at stake among NGOs, between NGOs and UN agencies, 
or humanitarian organizations and donor organizations (and, sometimes, between 
humanitarian organizations and aid recipients). When we watched humanitarian 
experts figuring out the right numbers, we saw them struggling with uncertainty, 
with doubts, and with the tensions of  the humanitarian field. When we listened 
to them describing what they were doing, these experts talked not only about 
science, they talked simultaneously about science, interest, power, and politics. 
We saw Jean Pictet redefining the humanitarian principles while addressing the 
conflict between ICRC and the Federation of  the Red Cross, we saw the Sphere 
Project setting universal standards while addressing the conflict between MSF and 
Oxfam. And we saw OCHA calculating vulnerability in Cameroon while trying to 
pacify the competition around the UNCHR. Looking at those conflicts historically 
means escaping the grand narrative of  aid organizations that suggests a clear-cut 
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separation between “scientific reason” on one hand and “political bargaining” on 
the other. In humanitarian statistics, scientific reason and political bargaining are 
folded into one another. 
 This is why this book has focused on figures that are located at the core of  
the humanitarian doxa – numbers of  refugees, numbers of  acute malnourished 
children, crude mortality rates, number of  people in need. Not only are these fre-
quently used indicators in humanitarian crisis; they also carry the burden of  the 
humanitarian consensus. The main bias of  the critical anthropology of  humani-
tarian quantification may be taking this consensus for granted, while assuming 
that humanitarian actors agree on figures because they share the same interests. 
The case studies in this book show quite the opposite. Humanitarian actors hold 
humanitarian statistics as a fetish not in spite of  but  because of  the fragility of  their 
position. The hubris of  humanitarian data has been fueled by doubts long before 
it has been fueled by arrogance. 
 Thus, questioning humanitarian quantification also means questioning the 
notion of  “consensus” which is the core of  the current humanitarian regime. As we 
saw, the notion of  a “shared humanitarian belief ” presented in the Humanitarian 
Charter signed by large NGOs in the early 2000s has been intrinsically linked to 
a positivist epistemology. The humanitarian regime has historically been framed 
by different normative horizons, illustrated successively by the Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare Act 1940 of  late colonial empire, the international conventions 
of  the 1950s to 1970s, and the Code of  Conduct of  the 1990s. A key feature of  
the Humanitarian Charter, however, is to celebrate consensus and the unity of  
the “humanitarian community,” and to discard power relations and inequalities 
(e.g., power relations between North and South, UN agencies and NGOs, donors 
and operational actors, public and private actors, expatriates and local employ-
ees). The Humanitarian Charter defines humanitarian work as a “partnership” 
among actors moved by “common principles” that are “universal” and sustained 
by “information” and “transparency.” Therefore, the question of  how a certain 
type of  statistical knowledge has become the guarantor of  humanitarian consen-
sus is central in efforts to understand how the current humanitarian regime works. 
 To ensure the structuring of  the humanitarian field, a central role has been con-
ferred to a set of  principles. Among these principles, “impartiality” is probably the 
least contested, but even this notion has changed a great deal over time. For Dunant 
in the nineteenth century, impartiality was a principle of  non-discrimination. Jean 
Pictet, in the 1940s and 1950s, changed the meaning of  impartiality by intro-
ducing the notion of  “proportionality” of  needs. This opened a new path that 
eventually led to an understanding of  impartiality as something like a mere rule 
of  arithmetic distribution of  resources (as in the Code of  Conduct’s current defi-
nition of  “impartiality”, which asserts that relief  aid should be “ calculated on the 
basis of  needs alone”). 
 Chapter 1 has shown that a major change had taken place between Dunant and 
Pictet, namely the emergence of  a  needology , a large, heterogeneous yet interlinked 
web of  institutional and scientific bodies of  knowledge, all focused on human 
need: Atwater’s work on caloric accounting, Rowntree’s poverty line, Maslow’s 
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theory of  motivation, as well as countless administrative, military, and scientific 
surveys on the needs of  the worker, the soldier, the poor, and the sick. In spite of  
their variety, these works shared the conviction that human needs mattered, and 
that they should be explored, objectified, compared, and quantified. They also 
shared the conviction that human needs, unlike suffering, were (at least partially) 
hidden. They shared, finally, the conviction that there was an uncertainty about 
what people needed, that even people in need could not know what they  truly 
needed, and eventually that people in need could not see what only expert knowl-
edge could uncover. The vast majority of  this knowledge, however, ignored the 
colonial population and focused instead on the global North. The notion of  “basic 
needs” eventually travelled the world in the 1970s, building a strong case of  uni-
versal standards, for their proponents, lowering social expectations and distracting 
from the struggle for global equality according to their critics. 
 In  Chapter 2 , we saw how a UN agency like the UNHCR has learned to 
classify the needs of  refugees. Humanitarian agencies, we found, became invet-
erate classifiers: They learned to stratify target groups along a sliding scale of  
needs. When attempting to make sense of  forced migration in Central Africa, 
the UNHCR applied several templates for classifying needs, eventually cutting 
across legal, economic, and medical categories. Thanks to the long history of  
thought about needs (including poverty studies and Maslow’s hierarchy, for 
instance), UNHCR was able to create classifications that mixed different modes 
of  ordering (a praxis that also had a long tradition in the UNRRA and other aid 
agencies). The UNHCR thus contributed to the export and diffusion of  needs 
classifications. 
 In  Chapter 3 , we saw how the materiality of  humanitarian tools added com-
plexity to the picture. The history of  the MUAC band as a tool of  humanitarian 
action really started when Biafran mothers learned to speak the language of  
humanitarianism: “After almost two years of  siege conditions,” a medical doc-
tor said, “every mother in Biafra knows what kwashiorkor means, knows that 
skimmed-dried milk will prevent or cure it, and will make sure her child gets it 
if  it is available.” 1 For aid agencies, humanitarian statistics should objectify a 
population’s needs without relying on their testimony. But the question of  com-
mensurability led to major tension between the humanitarian’s universal claims 
and the locality of  disease. The tropical doctors who invented the MUAC tape 
wanted to identify malnutrition and make it comparable on a global scale. They 
set universal standards and thresholds to do so. However, they knew that malnu-
trition had very different effects on individual patients’ bodies. The symptoms of  
acute malnutrition depended on many factors ranging from cultural practices to 
the environmental context. Some physicians and nutritionists therefore argued 
against universal standards and in favor of  “local,” “ethnic,” and “racial” stan-
dards. But this suggestion proved to be neither ethically nor politically viable in 
a post-Holocaust and postcolonial world. From this moment on, humanitarian 
quantification seemed to be trapped in an artificial polarization between  narrow 
universal standards, on one side, and  racial differentialism on the other. Many tools 
bear the weight of  this tension, tools like MUAC, as well as standardized tests, 
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standardized daily food rations or supplementary feeding rations like Plumpy’Sup, 
tents, kitchen sets, and many others. 
 As we saw in  Chapter 4 , this tension became obvious in the call for the “stan-
dardization” of  aid after the Rwandan genocide. The Sphere Project established 
a list of  minimum standards for humanitarian relief  that were supposed to be uni-
versal. This, the Sphere team argued, would improve the quality of  aid, because 
every crisis, every population, and every aid agency could now be assessed with a 
unique yardstick. Several NGOs protested, however, and showed the inadequacy 
of  universal standards by listing the many exceptions to the Sphere Project’s rules. 
Even the consultants involved in the Sphere Project were skeptical and the proj-
ect’s leaders were themselves conscious of  the pitfalls of  universal benchmarks. 
Although it was indeed possible to define a worldwide threshold for identifying an 
“emergency,” such as a crude mortality rate (CMR) of  1 death per 10,000 persons 
per day, in practice, this threshold would not be usable in either rich industrialized 
societies (in which the CMR would be much lower), or in the world’s poorest soci-
eties (in which the CMR would be almost as high under normal circumstances). 
A few years later, another solution was adopted: Each region of  the world would 
have its own CMR threshold for defining an emergency. Yet this meant that a 
catastrophe striking a sub-Saharan African society would now have to produce 35 
times more victims per day than it would in Europe to be called an “emergency.” 
Once again, quantitative humanitarianism could not escape the tension between 
universalism and localism. One aspect of  humanitarian that experts were keen to 
underplay, however, was the localism of  humanitarian universalism itself. While 
it was possible to fix standards and indicators to measure the services and goods 
delivered to the population, the idea of  setting standards to measure “whether we 
are respecting the dignity and rights of  the affected population” and “the potential 
negative side-effects of  the response” (in the words of  one expert) was discarded. 
It was thinkable to fix universal standards for the minimum dietary requirements 
of  refugees, but not for the salaries or the working conditions in refugee camps. 
 Chapters 5 and  6 looked at how concepts, classifications, tools, and stan-
dards came together in Cameroon in the wake of  the Central African crisis in 
2013/2014. This crisis took place against the backdrop of  a new hope that new 
technologies such as digitalization and computerization would make needs assess-
ment more efficient and more transparent. But here again, when we looked closer 
at the production of  humanitarian data, the idea of  robustness vanished. First, we 
encountered the competition between humanitarian actors. Then, we discovered 
the ambiguous role of  technologies. When hundreds of  thousands of  refugees 
arrived from Central Africa and Nigeria, UN agencies and NGOs competed for 
funds and public attention. The UNHCR registered the refugees and, together 
with IOM, they produced data according to legal status (refugees, internally dis-
placed persons, asylum seekers, etc.). Other organizations, such as UNICEF, pre-
ferred data based on vulnerability, such as numbers of  children suffering acute or 
chronic malnutrition. Thus, in order to cope with the massive amount of  data pro-
duced by the different actors, OCHA used brand new software into which every 
agency could enter its own indicators, from which the software could calculate 
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aggregates. But the role played by technology proved to be less straightforward 
than expected for two reasons. 
 First, while aid agencies did use mobile phones and an internet connection to 
produce their data, they did not only rely on high-tech solutions. Most humanitar-
ian quantification was not “digital” at all. It required cables, Jeeps, generators. It 
smelled more like gasoline than like silicon. Humanitarian data collection is often 
a banal, low-tech process: One takes notes with pencil and paper, distributes 
tokens by hand, measures children’s arms with MUAC tape, and marks houses 
with chalk. As a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, the long chain of  needs 
assessment can be derailed because of  a defective diesel generator or the lack of  
ink cartridges, long before any data has been uploaded to the cloud. 
 Second, computerization was not synonymous with greater transparency. 
OCHA’s software engineers invented a powerful tool for gathering and aggregat-
ing data, but the role played by the key algorithm in this process was known to 
only a handful of  specialists. It was no coincidence that the algorithm chosen by 
OCHA to ultimately aggregate data on vulnerability ended with a mathemati-
cal average between carefully balanced sectors. It was not the result of  scientific 
research on the relationship between indicators for the calculation of  “vulnerabil-
ity.” It was for the sake of  maintaining the fragile equilibrium of  the humanitar-
ian field, or, to recall the words of  the OCHA , “in order to avoid potentially long 
and fruitless discussions which could limit the tool’s ability to achieve consensus.” 
Thus, the historicization of  humanitarian quantification may help us to rethink 
this “consensus” and to unpack the relationship between technology and collec-
tive power. 
 Technoscience and humanitarian aid 
 There is growing temptation to delegate big decisions to big data. However, as we 
saw in the case studies, it is not uncommon for humanitarian experts to overes-
timate the power of  technical tools, while at the same time underestimating the 
power of  institutions. There is certainly hype about humanitarian innovation and 
its little magic devices. High-tech innovations, such as remote sensing, drones, 
and big data, are expected to produce better data, while bypassing national and 
local institutions. 2 Anthropologists have baptized this temptation for technologi-
cal fixes as “technological solutionism” 3 or the politics of  “simple solutions.” 4 As 
the history of  a principle such as “impartiality” showed, there is a tendency, in 
OCHA’s tools as well as in other humanitarian agencies’ quantitative endeavors, 
to stipulate an analogy between the ethico-legal notion of  humanitarian impar-
tiality and the scientific definition of  objectivity; thus, there is a tendency to mis-
take the calculation of  needs with the search for sustainable compromises. This 
view might overestimate the neutralizing power of  mathematical language. The 
idea that technology-backed quantification will bring more transparency, is, at 
best, a half-truth. 
 First, technology does play a key role in the construction of  figures, but not in the 
sense that is commonly assumed. As we saw in the case of  the MUAC tape, even 
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mundane artifacts are not neutral. They not only play their expected role – they 
do more. When Alfred Zerfas, Adnan Shakir, and David Morley fit malnutrition 
standards into a material device made of  plastic, they did  more than simply closing 
a controversy within anthropometry: They transformed the relationship between 
anthropometry and other fields of  knowledge. Not only would anthropometry 
after MUAC play a much more important role in identifying acute malnutrition 
than ever before; it would also often be a proxy of  food aid and humanitarianism 
as a whole. 5 Thus, a single, arguably debatable, indicator acquired visibility that 
even its inventors never imagined (and probably never wished for). Artifacts have 
effects, regardless of  whether we consider them useful. They contribute to shaping 
the humanitarian field. Once it had become a material object, the pioneers’ self-
critical doubts were forgotten. Having become material, the data appeared to be 
an incontestable truth. What had looked fragile now looked solid; what had looked 
questionable now took on the appearance of  certainty. 6 
 Second, the rapid growth of  numerical data may be mistaken for an increase in 
knowledge. However, higher visibility does not mean higher greater soundness or 
accuracy. As  Chapters 5 and  6 , have shown, more data does not always mean  better 
data. Something is lost in the process of  data aggregation and becomes a “known-
unknown” or a “public secret”; 7 that is, a piece of  knowledge that is widely known 
by the experts who produce the data but does not make it into the final report 
(and definitely not into the press release). Some information may be well-known to 
many humanitarian workers but remain unknown to their institutions: The inter-
play between different phenomena within one indicator, 8 the micro-relationships 
between power and inequality within local societies, 9 the multiple designations of  
diseases, 10 the strategies of  compositions of  wealth, and the social ramifications of  
needs, 11 to name but a few. 
 Notwithstanding the architectural metaphors that are intended to suggest 
solidity ( basic ,  fundamental ,  pyramid , etc.), humanitarian quantitative data is more 
fragile that it claims, while qualitative data is more accessible than we think. 12 
“Evidence-based” humanitarianism had mainly been interpreted in a narrow 
way; “evidence” meaning only “numbers,” and “data” only “quantitative data.” 
However, evidence can also mean historical knowledge, archives, books, testimo-
nies, and much more. As was seen in  Chapters 5 and  6 , humanitarian  quantification 
in practice often works in a similar manner to  qualitative observation: With direct, 
face-to-face interaction, and a pen and a piece of  paper. The problem does not lie 
in the nature of  quantitative data. They are, obviously, indispensable for decision-
making. The problem lies in the artificial separation of  quantitative and qualita-
tive data, leading to a relegation of  qualitative data as data of  less relevance or 
objectivity. In the “humanitarian overviews” produced by OCHA, as well as in 
many other reports, the descriptive part is reduced to an appendix consisting of  a 
graph, a map, or a number, while written reports are reduced to commentary on 
statistics. Qualitative data have gained a reputation for being more opaque, less 
efficient, and less reliable than numbers. But this reputation may result from an 
over-idealization of  what quantitative data are. 
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 The size of  human collectives 
 As we are facing increasing inequalities on a global scale, the pertinent scale for 
solidarity and redistribution is a pressing question. 13 Some argue for a return to 
ethnic or national communities. 14 Others, in contrast, are working toward soli-
darity on a world scale. Both positions rely on old traditions. Even the idea that 
humanity is  one has been present at least since the Renaissance and Bartholomeus 
de las Casas’ famous statements on the unity of  humankind. 15 Recently, the uni-
versalist position has been more and more supported by an  infrastructure of  commen-
surability that allows for transnational interventions. This infrastructure exposes the 
unequal distribution of  suffering on the world scale. 16 Thanks to the metonymi-
cal property of  “needs,” this infrastructure also allows for an energetic political 
imagination of  humanity as one. Yet this infrastructure also has a major flaw: It 
supports only a very thin,  minimalist version of  humanity. 
 First, humanitarian needology convenes an individualization of  suffering. It 
emphasizes three types of  actors:  Individuals (who suffer),  humanity as a whole (as a 
witness and donor), and  experts (who depict human suffering and decide on inter-
vention). This method of  commensuration jumps directly from individual bodies 
to the whole humanity, without intermediary stages (groups, villages, states, etc.). 17 
In Cameroon, aid agencies may hierarchize needs without serious reference to 
local stratification (governors, mayors, prefects, teachers,  lamidos ,  wakili ,  galdima , 
 sarkisaanou , etc.). On a larger scale, O’Brien’s administration might calculate 
“global need overviews” while silencing social struggles for equality and redistri-
bution. Individuals are seen to have needs that are not linked to social inequalities 
or power relations, thus implying that the responsibility for a person’s suffering 
ultimately relies on individual responsibility. Humanity is thought of  as an aggre-
gate entity. Humanitarian expertise considers “persons in need” to be individuals 
who are autonomous, independent, and interchangeable. Thus, it bypasses institu-
tions and tends to “depoliticize the issues of  power.” 18 
 A second aspect of  minimal universalism is the setting of  low standards. As 
stated in  Chapter 1 , in the 1970s, the ILO prescribed a daily food ration of  3,000 
kcal per person. In 2000, the Sphere standard was 2,100. 19 Admittedly, the ILO 
estimate was based on an “average adult,” while the Sphere standards used an 
average for a camp population with a “normal demography,” i.e. including chil-
dren and non-workers. But for a similar population, the ICRC’s estimate was 
2,400, thus showing that a higher standard was at least conceivable. The same is 
true for several thresholds and standards studied in this book, such as the crude 
mortality rate definition of  an emergency, or the cut-off  for “severe acute malnu-
trition” according to the measurement of  a child’s upper arm: In 1969, in Biafra, 
an arm measurement of  13 cm would have qualified as severe acute malnutrition. 
Today, a malnourished child has to have a thinner arm before they qualify for 
treatment: The WHO standard for acute severe malnutrition is currently 11.5 cm. 
In spite of  increasing global wealth since the Second World War, the definition of  
“the bare minimum” has not risen. If  anything, it has shrunk. 
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 The question at stake here is the very nature of  “humanity”: A long-distance 
society tied through mutual obligations, or a loose bond between people sharing 
mere “human nature”? 20 In the 1940s, the idea of  a vital minimum was closely 
associated with a claim for social justice and equality, even on a world scale. Now, 
humanitarianism has become a “prisoner of  the contemporary age of  inequal-
ity,” to borrow Samuel Moyn’s expression. 21 Humanitarian agencies might want 
to rethink this type of  universalism, for while it is successful in capturing the 
public’s imagination, it is narrow in what it measures – and thus it hollows out 
solidarity. 
 Repoliticizing basic needs 
 History might eventually become a resource for reproblematizing, or even repo-
liticizing, human needs. The first step – and what this book has been about – is to 
deontologize “human needs”: How did “basic needs” became the lowest common 
denominator of  humanity? It might be helpful here to compare humanitarian 
transnational solidarity and social welfare provision on a national scale. There are 
many traditions of  defining needs in welfare states: Guaranteed minimum wages, 
social insurance, and family allowances are examples of  institutionalized aid that 
include a definition of  minimum needs. Historically, this kind of  welfare provision 
has evolved from an “absolute” and minimal definition of  necessity, to a definition 
linked to growth indicators, for example, prices, salaries, or GDP. 22 In any case, 
the methods used to calculate welfare provisions are matters of  political and social 
struggle, not of  mere knowledge production. 
 Another approach to unpacking basic needs is to draw on the many historical 
examples of  anti-“basic needs” critique. A first reservoir of  criticism is of  course to 
be found in humanitarian expertise itself: The people who produce humanitarian 
data are often the most critical of  it. Derick Jelliffe, one of  the initiators of  MUAC, 
did not stop warning his colleagues about the possibility of  “false negatives” ( i.e . 
the possibility that this measurement would miss undernourished children). 23 Both 
the Sphere Project leaders and their consultants often admitted that the thresh-
olds they chose were “arbitrary.” 24 While measuring malnutrition in eastern and 
northern Cameroon, UNICEF nutritionists painstakingly listed all the good rea-
sons they had for being skeptical about their own numbers. As we have seen in 
this book, experts sometimes love self-criticism and always love to criticize other 
colleagues’ numbers. 25 Expert knowledge is thus a mine of  inspiration for criticism 
of  quantification. At times, it is epitomized in vocal controversies for example, as 
in the debate about the French letter against the Sphere standards. 26 Sometimes, 
they are well publicized, as was the former MSF president Rony Brauman’s skep-
ticism about needs assessments: “Who is capable of  really defining what ‘basic 
needs’ of  human beings are?” 27 
 Another tradition of  probably more radical critique can be found in the his-
tory of  philosophy. While Abraham Maslow was inventing his pyramid of  needs 
in New York, in their Los Angeles exile, Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
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were theorizing about the limits of  the category of  “needs.” 28 In 1942, the Frank-
furt School refuted the natural character of  and rejected the distinction between 
basic (or material) needs and secondary (or ideal) needs. 29 In a similar vein, but 25 
years later, the “French theorists” rediscovered the notion. 30 For Jean Baudrillard, 
need was nothing other than “a function induced in individuals by the internal 
logic of  the system.” He went as far as to write: “there are only needs because 
the system needs them.” 31 For him, “needs” were nothing more than a product 
of  ideology, an idea of  economists and psychologists, a metaphysical deception: 
“Everything that speaks in terms of  need is magical thinking,” he charged. 32 
There is no such thing as a “vital anthropological minimum” or an “irreduc-
ible zone.” 33 “Nowhere,” he wrote, “is man faced with his own needs.” 34 And 
Gilles Deleuze added: “As soon as problems are posed in terms of  need, what is 
invoked is in the end assumed to be law, both the nature of  these needs, and of  
their distribution, and of  the measure of  their satisfaction. To put the problems 
in terms of  needs is already to appeal, I think, to that which will be revealed to 
be a partisan organization.” 35 Twenty years later, and this time in the tradition 
of  critical and feminist sociology, Nancy Fraser again demonstrated the political 
character of  needs. Scientists and bureaucrats artificially isolate  needs from  inter-
ests , Fraser explains, and thus produce a concept of  needs as naturally occurring 
in an attempt to end political discussion. 36 
 Experts and philosophers, however, have not done more to debunk the idea 
of  basic needs than social movements. After the Second World War, the Con-
fédération Générale des Travailleurs (CGT) fought against the definition of  the 
“vital minimum” that the French employers wanted to impose upon the definition 
of  minimal wages. At the same time, in the colonies, the Commerce Worker’s 
Union (EMCIBA) of  Senegal denounced the colonial administration’s pseudo-
“scientific” definition of  minimum needs that set different standards for African 
workers and for Europeans. In the 1970s, a group of  postcolonial leaders were to 
conduct a similar attack on the notion of  needs on a different scale. Countries of  
the Non-Aligned Movement, now organized in the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO), dismissed the notion of  “basic needs” proposed by the World 
Bank, as a mere distraction from the more important question of  global economic 
inequality and exploitation. 37 When I met the Cameroonian politician Bernard 
Njonga in 2016, he explained that he expected malnutrition in Cameroon (using 
the term “famine”) to be fought not by NGOs, but in parliament, in elections, and 
on the streets. 38 
 One of  the reasons that people have historically resisted expert knowledge of  
basic needs is probably because this notion suffers from the projected shadow 
of  Maslow’s pyramid: A concept of  needs that is both universalist and differ-
entialist in a highly political manner. While the happy few at the summit of  the 
pyramid in search of  “self-realization” shall be asked what they need, at the bot-
tom of  the pyramid, the many in search of  fulfilling “physiological and security 
needs” should leave it to the experts to determine what they truly need. Rethink-
ing such assumptions might help to formulate a wider vision of  humanity. 
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